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NOTES
Potentiality of Incarceration: A Proposed Standard
for the Applicability of Miranda to Nonfelony
Offenses
In the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona,' the United States
Supreme Court held:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination.2
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the author of the majority opinion, did not,
however, expressly state whether the Miranda warnings3 are mandated in
connection with misdemeanors, motor vehicle violations and other petty
offenses. Because of the Court's silence, state and federal courts forced to
wrestle with the perplexing dilemma of the applicability of Miranda to
nonfelony offenses have relied on grossly disparate legal analyses reaching
inconsistent results.
This note examines these conflicting arguments in light of the
practical implications and spirit of the Miranda decision and in light of the
policies relevant to the constitutional rights upon which it was based. The
note proposes, as a reasonable standard in terms of policy and practicality,
that the potentiality of incarceration be the touchstone for determining
when nonfelony defendants are entitled to Miranda warnings.
WITHHOLDING MIRANDA WARNINGS IN NONFELONY OFFENSES
Through the litigation process the courts have developed a number of
rationales supporting the denial of Miranda rights in nonfelony cases.
Although somewhat overlapping, there are four basic arguments: (1)
1384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21d. at 444.
Miranda requires that an individual taken into custody and subjected to interrogation
must be informed before any questioning that he has the right to remain silent; that anything
he says may be used against him in a court of law; that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney; and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him before any
questioning if he so desires. 384 U.S. at 478-79.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
requiring Miranda warnings in nonfelony cases is impractical because of
the great number of such offenses; (2) nonfelony offenses are presumably
minor offenses with minor penalties, and the harm resulting from not
requiring Miranda warnings is inconsequential; (3) the Miranda rule is a
court-made rule of law which should be construed narrowly, and since
Miranda considered only felony offenses, a narrow application of the
holding limits it to felony offenses; and (4) misdemeanors do not generally
result in "custodial interrogation," and thus, the Miranda warnings are not
applicable. Although these arguments do have merit, they fail to fully
recognize substantial policy and constitutional issues.
The Impracticality of Application
The rationale most often used by courts refusing to apply Miranda to
nonfelony offenses is that to do so would be impractical in terms of sheer
numbers.4  It is argued that a great number of traffic offenders and
misdemeanants would be likely to request an attorney's assistance,5 thereby
substantially increasing court costs and possibly paralyzing court pro-
cessing. These courts also fear that applying Miranda to nonfelonies
would place an unduly onerous burden on law enforcement officers by
requiring them to allow misdemeanants to speak with their attorneys and
by requiring them to provide indigent misdemeanants with appointed
counsel before interrogation.6 The courts fear that such a rule would
4See, e.g., State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848, 850 (Del. 1968), which, while arguing that there
were practical reasons to treat motor vehicle offenses differently from most other offenses,
noted that the single offense of driving under the influence of alcohol had resulted in 1,087
arrests in Delaware in 1966.
5See State v. Macuk, 57 N.J 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970), which stated:
[D]uring the court year 1968-69, 726,763 non-parking traffic complaints were filed
in the municipal courts, of which 38%, or over 275,000, were disposed of by court
hearing. Certainly a substantial percentage of those involved police questioning of
indigent defendants which went beyond investigatory aspects and who could
demand the furnishing of a lawyer prior to interrogation if Miranda were to be held
applicable. The massive impossibility of doing so is manifest.
Id. at 17, 268 A.2d at 9. See also People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368, 213
N.E.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1965), where the New York Court of Appeals stated: "We point out that
the practical result of assigning counsel to defendants in traffic cases would be chaotic.
Assigning counsel in but 1% of these millions of cases could require the services of nearly half
the attorneys registered in the State." Id. at 312, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 371, 213 N.E.2d at 672.
6See, e.g., State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972). The court deemed it neither:
reasonable [n]or practical to rule that a trooper or other traffic officer investigating a
vehicular accident, or in arresting a driver for speeding or driving while intoxicated,
or other vehicular offenses, must give the Miranda warnings and possibly wait for
the driver to obtain an attorney, or for one to be appointed for him, before he tan
ask him the usual questions involved in such an investigation. And, as indicated,
there are probably not enough attorneys readily available to provide preinter-
rogation counsel for all of the persons desiring such that are involved in the
thousands of vehicular offenses that occur every year in this state.
Id. at 553.
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impede the effective investigation of misdemeanors and motor vehicle
offenses.7 These courts appear to assume that such recuirements would
increase the amount of time spent on each investigation, and since
misdemeanor offenses constitute the bulk of police investigations, they fear
that the requirements would slow the investigative process and create
unmanageable backlogs for the police and the courts.8 The following
language of Miranda is used in support of this denial of warnings to
misdemeanants:
In announcing these principles, we are not unmindful of the burdens
which law enforcement officials must bear, often under trying circum-
stances. . . . This Court, while protectirig individual rights, has always
given ample latitude to law enforcement agencies in the legitimate exercise
of their duties. The limits we have placed on the interrogation process
should not constitute an undue interference with a proper system of law
enforcement. As we have noted, our decision does not in any way preclude
police from carrying out their traditional investigatory functions. 9
Despite the number of courts which have utilized this practicality
rationale to rule Miranda inapplicable to nonfelony offenses, there is no
evidence to support their fears. 10 Indeed, what little empirical evidence is
available thoroughly discredits this practicality rationale." These data
7See State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972), where the court stated: "The practical
effect of a ruling requiring that the Miranda rule be complied with in vehicular cases would
be to substantially impair, if not destroy, the effectiveness of our system of investigating traffic
accidents and violations." Id. at 553. Accord, State v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa
1971); State v. Dubany, 184 Neb. 337, 167 N.W.2d 556 (1969). See also State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio
St. 2d 64, 67-68, 249 N.E.2d 826, 827-28 (1969), where the Ohio Supreme Court explains that a
misdemeanor, usually a traffic offense, generally takes place in the presence of the arresting
officer. Therefore, concentrated investigation or interrogation is rarely necessary. The
interrogation is normally conducted at or near the scene, not in any coercive atmosphere
created by the law enforcement officers once an individual has been taken into custody. But see
People v. McLaren, 55 Misc. 2d 676, 285 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1967), where the court, in applying
Miranda to a driving under the influence arrest, did not even consider the proposition that
Miranda warnings in a nonfelony situation might be detrimental to effective investigation by
law enforcement officials.
81n State v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1971), the Iowa Supreme Court
concluded: "To hold Miranda warning rules applicable to simple misdemeanors would
unduly interfere with proper law enforcement in that area and-preclude the police from
carrying out their traditional investigatory functions." Id. at 796. See State v. Macuk, 57 N.J.
1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970), where the court stated that "the violations [involving motor vehicle
offenses] are not serious enough in their consequences to warrant the time consuming
interference which would result to effective law enforcement and the expeditious adminis-
tration of justice in petty offense cases." Id. at 16, 268 A.2d at 9.
9Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966).
10See State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
"See Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
This study states: "In a primarily statistical analysis, we conclude that there is no evidence
indicating that the warnings ... caused many suspects to refuse to talk or ask for counsel." Id.
at 1523. The study further stated: "Our findings suggest Miranda will rarely bring lawyers to
the stationhouse. Defendants, told of their right to counsel, usually neglect the offer and let
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indicate that Miranda's effect on individuals' requests for assistance of
counsel is minimal. The data further show that requests for attorneys
increase only when the offense is of a more serious nature.
1 2
The courts invoking this practicality rationale appear to be weighing
the state's presumed burden, created by requiring warnings, against the
injury to the defendant who is not given the warning. By assuming that the
duty to warn creates an onerous burden on the state, courts find such a duty
too burdensome to be required.'3 This belief is without basis. As the
empirical evidence suggests, the burden on the state will be slight, at least
in relation to the potential injury which the defendant faces. Of the large
number of new defendants receiving Miranda warnings, only a few
individuals should be expected to request the assistance of counsel or to
refuse to cooperate. 14 Furthermore, given the ease with which Miranda
warnings can be given,15 impracticality is a weak agrument for denying the
application of Miranda to misdemeanants.
The Minor Nature of the Offense
A second rationale advanced by some courts refusing to apply Miranda
to lesser offenses is that such violations do not generally involve serious
consequences. 16 These courts assume that if potential injury to a defendant
is minor then no serious harm occurs if warnings are not given. The basis
of this rationale appears to involve a balancing test similar to that used in
interrogation proceed." Id. at 1600. See also Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police
Interrogation in Our Nation's CapitaL" The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MiCe. L. REv.
1347 (1968). The study presented findings of Miranda's implementation in the District of
Columbia where twenty-four hour availability of counsel for defendants was arranged for one
year. During fiscal 1967, only 7 percent (1,262 of 15,430) of the persons arrested for felonies
and serious misdemeanors requested counsel from the arranged attorney service. Id. at 1352.
"2Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 11, stated: "If all 73,492 nontraffic offenses are
considered, the rate of those requesting counsel is only 2%. As might have been expected, the
rate of calls for lawyers.., was higher for persons charged with more serious offenses ..." Id.
at 1353 n.23.
13But see State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547, 554 (Mo. 1972) (dissenting opinion), where it was
stated that, "[i]t is a mistake, in my opinion, to decide the question of whether the Miranda
rule applies to a drunken driving charge on the erroneous assumption the police would be
swamped with requests for counsel if the rule is held to apply to motor vehicle offenses in
general ...... Id. at 554.
14See notes 11 &c 12 supra.
sSee State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848, 850 n. * (Del. 1968). Although the court held Miranda
warnings inapplicable to motor vehicle offenses, the court did note that police are advised to
give the Miranda warning because it is "easily given and, if given, forestalls delays in
dispostion of cases in instances like the present one." Id. See also State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d
547, 554 (Mo. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
16See, e.g., State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970) stating, "the violations involved
are not serious enough in their consequences to warrant the time consuming interference
which would result to effective law enforcement and the expeditious administration of justice
in petty offense cases." Id. at 16, 268 A.2d at 9.
[Vol. 52:449
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connection with the practicality rationale. 17 Nevertheless, these courts seem
loathe to delineate the considerations which lead them to strike the balance
as they do, simply holding that Miranda is inapplicable to minor
offenses.18
Although the absence of serious consequences in most petty offenses
and misdemeanors may weigh against the issuance of Miranda warnings, it
should be emphasized that under some statutes the consequences of such
offenses may be great.' 9 Recognition of this fact seems to have motivated
"7See notes 6-8 supra & text accompanying.
1ln County of Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1971), the arresting officer testified
that he witnessed the defendant drive her automobile into a properly parked car on the street.
He went to the scene, observed the defendant's physical condition and conduct, and then
arrested her. The officer testified that he did not give the defendant Miranda warnings. After
explaining that driving under the influence of an intoxicating beverage and careless driving
amount to a misdemeanor or petty offense and not to a felony, the court simply held: "[T]he
Miranda warnings need not be given on these petty offenses as they are presently defined
under these metropolitan ordinances." Id. at 507.
In Clay v. Riddie, 391 F. Supp. 1049 (W.D. Va. 1975), the court reached a similar
conclusion. In Riddle, the defendant was stopped pursuant to a motor vehicle violation.
Without giving Miranda warnings, the police officer asked the petitioner if he was the driver
of the car. The petitioner acknowledged that he was. Subsequently it developed that
petitioner had violated a more serious law, felonious operation of a motor vehicle, in that he
had driven on public highways after having been declared an habitual traffic offender.
Although the petitioner received a one year sentence, the court held that "the required
warnings announced in Miranda ... do not apply to offenses of so common and minor a
nature as a motor vehicle violation." Id. at 1051.
In State v. Macuk, 57 NJ. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970), the defendant was convicted of operating
an automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He had not been apprised of his
Miranda rights. Under New Jersey law, motor vehicle violations are not crimes, but only
petty offenses which entail no right to indictment or to a jury. Id. at 5, 268 A.2d at 5. Such
offenses are tried in the first instance in a summary manner in the municipal court, and jail
sentences resulting therefrom may not exceed six months. In affirming the defendant's
conviction and sentence, the court held Miranda inapplicable to all motor vehicle offenses. Id.
at 15-16, 268 A.2d at 9.
191n State v. Bunders, 68 Wis. 2d 129, 227 N.W.2d 727 (1975), the court held that Miranda
warnings were not required when an arrested driver is asked to submit to a breathalyzer.
However, if the police do in fact interrogate the driver as to his driving or intoxication, then
the full panoply of Miranda will be required. In reaching this conclusion, the court gave
weight to the consideration that an intoxicated driver may be convicted of operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant which carries a maximum one year jail sentence.
Id. at 134, 227 N.W.2d at 730.
See also State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 10, 268 A.2d 1, 6 (1970), where the court pointed out
that a second conviction of driving under the influence within ten years of a previous
conviction imposes a mandatory three month sentence plus a ten year license forfeiture. In this
modern age, many would consider the loss of a driver's license for ten years a serious
consequence.
See also Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. Ray. 685, 712
(1968). In the context of arguing in favor of the right to counsel in certain misdemeanor cases,
Junker suggests: "(there is little doubt that for sixth amendment purposes it ["crime"] ought
to include proceedings in which the individual is exposed to the possibility of incarceration or
to the stigma that flows from official condemnation." See notes 89-91 infra & text
accompanying. Compare the dissent in State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972), which noted
the fallacy of distinguishing crimes from petty offenses on the basis of language rather than
logic. The dissent stated that excepting:
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the court in Commonwealth v. Bonser2 0 There the appellee hit a parked
car and was arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
a misdemeanor in Pennsylvania. The maximum penalty involved was three
years' imprisonment and a five-hundred dollar fine.21 The court distin-
guished cases from other states which had held Miranda inapplicable to
drunk driving infractions; it found that in those jurisdictions driving under
the influence was regarded as only a minor offense for which small fines
and short jail sentences were provided, in contrast to the severe penalty
possible in Pennsylvania. 22 In light of the substantial loss of liberty if
convicted, the court concluded that "[U]nder these circumstances he is
entitled to full protection under the Constitution as implemented by
Miranda. Nor should there be any different holding because the offense is
found in The Vehicle Code instead of The Penal Code. 23
In determining whether or not to apply Miranda, it seems correct that a
failure to give the warnings may result in little harm when the offense is
clearly minor and can result in only a minimal penalty. On the other hand,
when the potential injury to an individual is great, the labels "mis-
demeanor" or "motor vehicle offense" are not sufficient bases for denying
Miranda warnings. 24 Such a system fails to provide the necessary con-
stitutional safeguards to those who are charged with a nonfelony offense,
yet who face the prospect of severe consequences. 25
all offenses involving the operation of a motor vehicle from the application of
Miranda would equate a speeding ticket with a prosecution for manslaughter by
culpable negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle... Assuming that the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel are divisible so as to
apply in some cases and not in others, the consequences of conviction may in sum
total be as serious for the misdemeanant as for the felon.
Id. at 556.
20215 Pa. Super. Ct. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969).211d. at 459-60, 258 A.2d at 680.221d.
23d. at 460, 258 A.2d at 680.
214For example, the motor vehicle offense of hit and run manslaughter may result in a
lengthy jail sentence. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-13-4-2 (Bums Supp. 1976).25The problem remains of where to draw the line. Furthermore, once the line is drawn
in accordance with the potential consequences attending the particular offense, a problem
arises from the practical necessity that the police officer in each situation know the
classification and maximum sentence for the particular offense involved before he can
determine if he is required to give the Miranda warnings. Nevertheless, the police lose little
by giving suspects warnings which turn out to have been unnecessary. They lose much by
having failed to give warnings to suspects who are subsequently found to have been entitled to
them. The Supreme Court has suggested, in analogous contexts of other constitutional rights,
two appropriate places to draw the line. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 US. 25 (1972) (right
to counsel afforded wherever a defendant is charged with an imprisonable offense); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (no right to jury trial in petty offenses carrying a penalty of less
than six months' imprisonment). This note argues that the Argersinger standard is the more
persuasive analogy to the issue considered here, as the Miranda warnings include advising a
suspect of his right to have the assistance of counsel. See notes 86-95 infra & text
accompanying.
[Vol. 52:449
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Narrow Application of a Court-Made Rule
Another major argument advanced against the application of Miranda
to misdemeanors involves the principle that a court-made rule of law must
be narrowly read to apply only to the facts precipitating the rule. An
example of this rationale can be found in State v. Pyle26 where the Ohio
Supreme Court reversed a lower court's determination 7 that Miranda
warnings were required in instances involving the misdemeanor of driving
under the influence of intoxicants. Noting that Miranda and its three
companion cases all involved serious felonies with long jail sentences and
taking judicial notice that investigative procedures ordinarily followed
with respect to misdemeanors differ markedly from the procedures with
respect to felonies, the court concluded that "the United States Supreme
Court, in Miranda, was concerned with the procedures followed by law
enforcement officers in investigations in felony cases, not with the
procedures adhered to by those same authorities in investigations in
misdemeanor cases."'28 The court therefore held Miranda inapplicable to
all misdemeanors. This court and many other courts assumed that
procedures involved in investigating and prosecuting misdemeanors are
markedly different from those employed in felony cases.29 Felony investiga-
tions were characterized as "lengthy incommunicado police interrogation
seeking to sweat out a confession,"3 0 while misdemeanor investigations, on
the other hand, were stereotyped as routine perfunctory procedures pre-
senting no special dangers to a defendant.3 l Since the Supreme Court
2619 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970).
27State v. Pyle, 18 Ohio App. 2d 33, 246 N.E.2d 577 (1969).
281d. at 66-67,249 N.E.2d at 827.
"See, e.g., State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970):
[T]he type of police questioning involved in motor vehicle violations is not
ordinarily the lengthy, incommunicado inquistion seeking to "sweat out" a
confession at which Miranda was aimed. Generally it encompasses only simple
standard inquiries for the purpose of a necessary accident or violation police report,
even though some of the information obtained may go beyond the so-called
investigatory phase and be inculpatory as to the violation.
Id. at 16, 268 A.2d at 9.
301d. See also State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972), where the court determined that
Miranda does not apply to misdemeanor motor vehicle offenses because the dangers inherent
in a felony investigation were not incurred by a misdemeanor investigation. In describing the
practices of felony investigations which Miranda intended to prohibit, the court stated, "[i]t is
significant that all four of the cases encompassed in Miranda involved very serious crimes
(murder, rape, robbery, and kidnapping), and that the primary purpose of that opinion was to
proscribe the practice of lengthy incommunicado police interrogation seeking to "sweat out"
confessions." Id. at 552.
31In State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 431 P.2d 691 (1967), the court explains that the
Miranda standards were established to thwart possible attempts by authorities to attain
confessions and admissions through intimidation and coercion. Although recognizing that
the language of Miranda applies to crimes and that Arizona law clearly establishes that both
misdemeanors and felonies are crimes, the court, nonetheless, distinguishes "routine" traffic
violations from those traffic offenses where the violator is arrested. The court observed that
19771
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considered only felony procedures in its Miranda decision, many lower
courts have held that Miranda must be limited to only those circum-
stances.
3 2
The assumption that the police practices which Miranda sought to
eliminate do not occur in misdemeanor cases has little support. This issue
was clearly presented in People v. McLaren.3 In McLaren, the defendant
was the driver of an automobile involved in an accident. A police officer
arrived at the scene, arrested the defendant for driving while intoxicated,
and took him into custody. 4 At the precinct house the defendant was
subjected to an interview consisting of forty-four questions from a form
questionnaire and to a series of performance tests pertaining to balance. At
no time during this custody and questioning was the defendant given any
warnings concerning his right to counsel and his right against self-
incrimination. The state, however, attempted to introduce information
gained from the custodial interrogation at the defendant's trial. The court
suppressed the evidence because of the failure to warn defendant of his
rights under Miranda.3 - The facts of this case clearly support the pro-
position that the police practices which Miranda sought to eliminate-the
employment of techniques to elicit incriminating evidence from a defen-
dant who remains unaware of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to have the assistance of counsel-will continue to occur if such warnings
can be denied solely because an offense is labelled a misdemeanor.
"traffic offenses are not ones in which we find such a risk of this kind of official behavior. In
most cases, the offender is not detained longer than is needed to make out a citation and have it
signed. A.R.S. § 28-1054. Often he may remain in his own car." Id. at 255, 431 P.2d at 695.
See also State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380, 226 A.2d 16 (1967), where the court held Miranda
inapplicable to misdemeanors as it pointed out that the Miranda rules are not contained in the
Constitution, but were adopted by the Supreme Court. The opinion states that "[t]he
question is not whether the rights against self-incrimination and to counsel exist in a motor
vehicle prosecution, but whether the Supreme Court intended that in such a prosecution those
rights must always be implemented with the Miranda rules." Id. at 390, 226 A.2d at 22. The
court believed that the police practices which precipitated the Miranda ruling have no
pertinence to minor offenses. The court presumes that the Supreme Court is "of course, fully
aware of the problems which would be entailed if Miranda were applied willy-nilly to all
minor offenses." Id. at 391, 226 A.2d at 23.
32See State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380, 226 A.2d 16 (1967), where the court stated that
"until the United States Supreme Court says otherwise, we think we should assume, and we
do believe, that its treatment of such cases as the one at bar would be based on what is
practical and possible, and on the historical difference between such offenses and crimes." Id.
at 391, 226 A.2d at 23.
-555 Misc. 2d 676, 285 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1967).
311d. at 678, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
311d. at 680, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 995. It is interesting that the court suppresses "out of hand"
the answers to the questionnaire under the authority of Miranda. Nowhere in the opinion
does the court discuss the applicability of Miranda to misdemeanors. The court simply
assumes Miranda's applicability.
[Vol. 52:449
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Further support for this logic can be found in Commonwealth v.
Bonser.M6 In Bonser, the defendant was taken into custody on a charge of
driving under the influence of alcohol but was not informed of his
constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The prosecution attempted to
overcome the failure to issue the Warnings on the grounds that the Supreme
Court's silence in Miranda regarding the question of misdemeanors
indicated that such rights did not apply to misdemeanors.3 7 The Bonser
court, however, interpreted that silence quite differently. in its discussion of
the question whether the misdemeanor conviction before it was distin-
guishable in terms of constitutional safeguards from the felony convictions
in Miranda, the court deemed Miranda's general holding significant. The
Bonser majority found no indication in Miranda "that one accused of a
misdemeanor, who faces the potential of a substantial prison sentence,
must subject himself to police interrogation absent the fundamental
safeguards afforded others."3 8 To deny a defendant Miranda warnings
solely because the Court in Miranda failed to sweep within its holding
misdemeanor offenses is without basis. The dangers the Court wished to
- proscribe in Miranda arise as easily in misdemeanors as in felonies. It is'
thus illogical to distinguish the applicability of Miranda solely on the basis
of an offense's classification as a misdemeanor or felony.39
Custodial Interrogation
Even in cases that do not present a problem of whether Miranda
warnings must be given, the problem of when they must be given has
plagued courts ever since the Supreme Court decided Miranda.40 Its
standard of requiring warnings prior to "custodial interrogation" has
resulted in varying approaches to determine the point in the investigatory
process at which the warnings should be issued.4' In the nonfelony context
36215 Pa. Super. Ct. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969).
371d. at 458, 258 A.2d at 679.
581d. at 458, 258 A.2d at 679 (foomote omitted).
39rhis point was succinctly noted by the dissent in State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249
N.E.2d 826 (1969):
It is inconsistent to hold that the Miranda warning aspect of the privilege
against self-incrimination is not applicable to misdemeanors, while no suggestion is
made that the other judicial interpretations concerning the privilege against self-
incrimination are not applicable to misdemeanors. A defendant charged with a
misdemeanor could never be compelled to take the witness stand, or, if he testified
could he ever be compelled to give an answer incriminating himself, nor could the
prosecution comment on such a defendant's failure to testify. The privilege against
self-incrimination is not divisible so as to exclude a crime for which a person may
be imprisoned for one year or less.
Id. at 69-70, 249 N.E.2d at 829.40See, e.g., Note, Two Approaches to Defining Custody Under Miranda, 36 FORDHAm L.
Rav. 141 (1967).
4 On this point, the Supreme Court stated that "[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
1977]
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some courts have confused the issue of when warnings should be given
with the question of whether warnings should be given. These courts
avoid the real issue of whether Miranda applies to nonfelonies by taking a
restrictive view of custodial interrogation in the nonfelony situation.
An example of this confusion can be found in State v. Desjardins 2 In
that case, an officer approaching an accident scene saw the defendant
standing on the passenger side of the vehicle. The defendant, who smelled
of alcohol and was bleeding, was arrested for drunkenness.43 The defendant
Was then asked without the benefit of Miranda warnings if he was the
driver of the vehicle. The defendant answered that he was. The officer
then arranged to have the defendant sent to a hospital for treatment and a
blood test while he went to swear out a warrant against the defendant for
driving while intoxicated. The officer returned to the hospital, again
arrested the defendant, and advised him of his rights under Miranda." The
New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed his subsequent conviction,
denying that prior to the issuance of the warnings following his second
arrest defendant had been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom in any significant way. 45 The court viewed the officer's initial
inquiry as merely part of the "general on-the-scene questioning" 46 which
Miranda was not intended to impede. The court seemed to give no weight
,to the fact that the officer had indeed arrested the defendant-thus
establishing custody- 47 before interrogating him as to who was the driver.
It seems clear that the issue of whether Miranda warnings are required,
and if so at what point such warnings are required, are distinct questions.48
They should be treated as such. If it is determined that warnings are
necessary, the standards used to discern custodial interrogation should be
the same for both felonies and nonfelonies. 49 Courts have struggled with
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (emphasis added).
42110 N.H. 511, 272 A.2d 599 (1970).
43Id. at 511-12, 272 A.2d at 600.
44On appeal the defendant contended his statement that he had been driving must be
excluded because it resulted from interrogation while he was in custody and before he was
apprised of his rights. Id. at 513, 272 A.2d at 601.
45Id. at 513, 272 A.2d at 601.46See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).47State v. Desjardins, 110 N.H. at 515-16, 272 A.2d at 602-03 (dissenting opinion). The
dissent attacks the majority's narrow construction of custody, pointing out that Miranda
specifically limited general on-the-scene investigations to "persons not under restraint." The
dissent argues persuasively that the defendant, being under arrest, was under restraint and in
the officer's custody when asked if he was driving. Id.
Cf. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), where the Supreme Court reversed a conviction
for the failure to give defendant Miranda warnings. Although questioned in his own
bedroom, the defendant, according to the officer's testimony, had been under arrest and was
not free to leave.
18See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1076, 1081 (1969).
19But see State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972). In Neal, the officer arrested the
defendant and immediately advised him that any answers he gave could be used against him.
[Vol. 52:449
NONFELONY OFFENSES
the custodial interrogation concept in order to avoid reversing misde-
meanor convictions for the failure to follow Miranda. The Desjardins
court viewed custody restrictively in order to broaden "general on-the-scene
questioning" to encompass the case before it.50 The court in Common-
wealth v. Bonser,1 on the other hand, applied the same custodial interroga-
tion standard that has been developed in felony cases to the misdemeanor of
driving while intoxicated.5 2 This approach seems clearly superior, at least in
regard to misdemeanors involving substantial consequences.
The court in State v. Kinn3 also applied the same test of custodial
'interrogation to misdemeanors as would apply to felonies. The Kinn
opinion focused on the difficulty in distinguishing on-the-scene investi-
gations from custodial interrogations. In attempting to clarify the distinc-
tion, the court stated:
The police are not required to give a Miranda warning to every bystander
or person in the vicinity of a happening which it is their duty to
investigate. They may properly elicit information in the ordinary course
of their investigative woik. While it is not suggested that police may defer
the formal arrest in order to gather further admissions, an officer should
not be required to give a warning statement until he has reasonable
grounds to believe both that a 'crime has been committed and that the
defendant is the culprit. When it appears that, in the performance of his
duties, the officer determines to take a person into custody, or, in other
words, when the point is~ reached where the adversary system begins to
operate, he is required to give the Miranda warning.5 4
Good reasons exist for abandoning the foregoing approaches which deny
Miranda warnings in nonfelony contexts. There are also, however, sound
476 S.W.2d at 552. However, the officer did not offer the rest of the w'rxiings. Thereafter,-
defendant in answer to the officer's inquiry admitted driving the vehicle.
Despite a prima fade violation of Miranda, the court ruled that the warnings were not
required to bring into evidence admissions made to investigative officers by individuals
involved in motor vehicle offenses "regardless of whether the questions are asked before or
after the arrest." Id. at 553. In contrast to the Desiardins method of restricting "custodial
interrogation," the Neal court simply chose to hold Miranda inapplicable in such a situation,
thereby leaving unclear the role "custodial interrogation" played in the court's decision.
Compare State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972), with State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249
N.E.2d 826 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970). In Pyle, the court simply held Miranda
inapplicable without any discussion of "custodial interrogation." See generally Note,
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Application of Miranda v. Arizona to Motor Vehicle
Violations, 38 Mo. L. REv. 652, 654 n.14 (1973).50See also State v. Darnell, 8 Wash. App. 627, 508 P.2d 613, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112
(1973). The court interprets "custodial interrogation" narrowly in order to uphold a
misdemeanor conviction. Note the lack of discussion of the applicability of Miranda to
misdemeanors.
51215 Pa. Super Ct. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969).
S21d. at 459, 258 A.2d at 679. In response to the prosecution's contention that one
arrested for this offense is not entitled to warnings before custodial interrogation, the court
stated: "There is no indication [in Miranda] that one accused of a misdemeanor . . . must
subject himself to police interrogation absent the fundamental safeguards afforded others." Id.
at 458, 258 A.2d at 679 (footnote omitted).
51288 Minn. 31, 178 N.W.2d 888 (1970).
S11d. at 35, 178 N.W.2d at 891 (emphasis added).
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policy reasons that militate against absolute application of Miranda in all
such situations.
APPLYING MIRANDA TO ALL NONFELONY OFFENSES
Not all courts have mechanically denied the application of Miranda to
misdeameanors. Many courts have recognized the constitutional and policy
arguments favoring application. There are two basic arguments: (1)
nonfelonies are criminal offenses and should be treated as such under the
fifth and sixth amendments; and (2) Miranda warnings were intended to
provide constitutional safeguards in situations where harsh consequences
might evolve from coercive custodial interrogation, and since misde-
meanors are quite likely to result in harsh consequences, they should be
within Miranda's reach. Both of these arguments fail, however, to fully
consider the practical difficulties of an absolute rule requiring Miranda
warnings in all nonfelony offenses.
Implications of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
A primary argument advanced in favor of the application of Miranda
to misdemeanors is that such application is mandated by the language of
the fifth55 and sixth5 6 amendments. This position was taken in Common-
wealth v. Bonser,57 which held that a person arrested for the misdeameanor
of driving under the influence of alc6hol is entitled to Miranda warnings. 58
In support of its holding, the court in Bonser points to the fifth and sixth
amendments' absence of any distinction between serious and minor crimes.
Those amendements refer only to "criminal case" and "criminal prose-
cutions" respectively.5 9 Since driving under the influence is an indictable
offense in Pennsylvania, the Bonser court concluded that it clearly falls
within the ambit of a "criminal case" or "criminal prosecution." 60
The term "crime" has traditionally been construed to include misde-
meanors. As early as 1888 the Supreme Court construed the term "crime" 61
to include all felonies and misdeamors which involve the deprivation of
liberty.62  This followed an even earlier determination that the term
55
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces ... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.56
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
57215 Pa. Super. Ct. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969).
58See notes 20-23 supra & text accompanying.
59See notes 55-56 supra.
60215 Pa. Super Ct. 452, 459, 258 A.2d 675, 679 (1969).61U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
62"It would be a narrow construction of the constitution to hold that no prosecution for
a misdemeanor is a prosecution for a 'crime' within the meaning of the third article or a
'criminal prosecution' within the meaning of the sixth amendment." Callan v. Wilson, 127
U.S. 540, 549 (1888).
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"[c]rime is synonymous with misdemeanor, and includes every offense
below felony punished by indictment as an offense against the public.
63
Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution it is nearly
impossible to conclude that a felony is a crime but that a misdemeanor is
not. Any distinction between the two is manifestly artificial.
A line of analysis relating to the artificiality of the distinction between
misdemeanors and felonies was espoused by two Ohio lower court opinions
holding that Miranda applied to the misdemeanor of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence.64 Although both courts were reversed by
the Ohio Supreme Court's blanket ruling that Miranda was inapplicable to
all misdemeanors, 65 both courts had held that a distinction between
misdemeanors and felonies is an insufficient justification to affect the basic
question of fairness which is an inherent quality of every constitutional
safeguard. 66 The court in City of Piqua v. Hunger 7 stated:
The Constitution is, of course, aloft from administrative inconvenience,
and we perceive no other valid reason for lowering its protective shield
during the trial of misdemeanor cases. The onerous prospect of confine-
ment in the county jail rather than the state penitentiary is hardly an
adequate substitute for a fair trial . . .68
In City of Piqua the defendant had been convicted of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The defendant was not
advised of his right to counsel until after the officers had taken movies of
his actions at the police station, administered a breath test and received
answers to questions from a police questionnaire. The appellate court,
citing Miranda, reversed the trial court's conviction. The court remarked
that even though the defendant was not a criminal in the usual sense, he
was entitled to identical constitutional protection to that afforded hardened
criminals. 69
Following City of Piqua, the appellate court in State v. Pyle70 also
found that Miranda applied to the misdemeanor of operating a motor
6SKentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 76 (1860). See also Guetling v. State, 199 Ind. 630,
158 N.E. 593 (1927) (crime includes all grades of public offenses which at common law
included treason, felony, and misdemeanor); State v. Blitz, 171 Mo. 530, 71 S.W. 1027 (1903)
("crime" construed to be any offenses, misdemeanor or felony, for which imprisonment may
follow); In re Voorhes, 32 N.J.L. 141 (1867) (crime includes every type of indictable offense.64State v. Pyle, 18 Ohio App. 2d 33, 246 N.E.2d 577 (1969), rev'd, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249
N.E.2d 826 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970); City of Piqua v. Hunger, 13 Ohio App.
2d 108, 234 "N.E.2d 321 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 44 Ohio Op. 2d 81 (1968).
6sState v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007
(1970). See notes 26-29 supra & text accompanying.
"6City of Piqua v. Hunger, 13 Ohio App. 2d 108, 112, 234 N.E.2d 321, 324 (1967).
6713 Ohio App. 2d 108, 234 N.E.2d 321 (1967).
68Id. at 112, 234 N.E.2d at 324.
6Id. at 112, 234 N.E.2d at 323-24. The court in City of Piqua cites City of Columbus v.
Hayes, 9 Ohio App. 2d 38, 222 N.E.2d 829 (1967), a contrary court of appeals ruling, which
had held the Miranda ruling inapplicable to the offense of driving under the influence of
alcohol. The City of Piqua court discounts that case, after pointing out that it offered no
reasons for its conclusion.
7018 Ohio App. 2d 33, 246 N.E.2d 577, rev'd, 19 Ohio St. 2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969).
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vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court opined that the
artificial distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is not a realistic
basis for deciding whether Miranda should apply to misdemeanors. The
court stated that "the activation of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination should be based upon criteria which is [sic] more stable and
discernible than the theoretical difference between confinement in the
county jail and confinement in the state penitentiary."171
The contention that the fifth and sixth amendments require that
Miranda be applicable to all crimes, whether misdemeanor or felony, may
rely too heavily on a literal interpretation of the language in those
amendments. 7 2 Basing the threshold test for the necessity of Miranda
warnings on the'definition of "criminal prosecution," "criminal case," or
perhaps "crime" would result in inconsistency among the states due to the
varying definitions of these terms from state to state. For instance, under
New Jersey law motor vehicle violations are not included within the
definition of crime or criminal prosecution,7 3 but in Pennsylvania at least
some motor vehicle violations fall within the category of criminal case or
criminal prosecution. 74  Determining Miranda's application to misde-
meanors, motor vehicle violations and other petty offenses on the basis of
how broadly each state defines these terms is too mechanical7 5 to serve the
substantial interest of protection of fundamental liberties articulated in
Miranda.
"State v. Pyle, 18 Ohio App. 2d 33, 34, 246 N.E.2d 577, 578 (1969), rev'd, 19 Ohio St. 2d
64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969). The dissenting opinion in the Ohio Supreme Court's reversal
criticizes the inherent inconsistency in holding Miranda inapplicable to misdemeanors. 19
Ohio St. 2d at 69-70, 249 N.E.2d at 829. The artificality of such distinctions is highlighted by
the fact that in Ohio, a misdemeanant may be imprisoned for up to six months in a county jail.
See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.21 (Page 1975).
"2See note 93 infra. The Supreme Court has apparently rejected a literal
interpretation of the "criminal prosecution" language of the sixth amendment in the right to
counsel context. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 33 (1976) (summary court-martial
held not a "criminal prosecution" for purposes of the sixth amendment); see generally
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation proceeding held not
a "criminal proceeding"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile hearings not a "criminal
_proceeding"; nevertheless counsel held required).
In Middendorf, the Court stated that Gault and Gagnon "surely stand for the
proposition that even in the civilian community a proceeding which may result in deprivation
of liberty is nonetheless not a 'criminal proceeding' within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment if there are elements about it which sufficiently distinguish it from a traditional
civilian criminal trial." 425 U.S. at 38.
The Supreme Court, however, could easily distinguish these cases in the future; they
respectively concern courts-martial in the military community, probation revocation of
persons already convicted and juvenile hearings which have special rehabilitative purposes,
and are thus sui generis. See note 93 infra.
"State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 9-10, 268 A.2d 1, 5 (1970).
"Commonwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super Ct. 452, 459, 258 A.2d 675, 679 (1969).751ndeed, in order to dispense with the requirement of Miranda warnings, a state
legislature could merely redefine these terms as noncriminal in nature under such a
mechanical test.
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Possibility of Severe Consequences
Perhaps the most compelling argument offered to support the applica-
bility of Miranda to nonfelonies comes from the harsh consequences
resulting from some of these offenses. 76  In many states, convictions
resulting from certain misdemeanors involve heavy fines or lengthy
imprisonment, or both. 77 Moreover, in some states conviction of certain
motor vehicle violations may result in permanent loss of one's operator's
license, 78 certainly a serious consequences in this vehicular age.
In Commonwealth v. Bonser79 the court accorded significant weight to
the potentially serious consequences and refused to hold Miranda inappli-
cable to all misdemeanors. After pointing out that the defendant faced
a possible sentence of three years for driving under the influence of alcohol,
the court stated that "the appellee, if convicted, faces a substantial loss of
liberty. Under these circumstances he is entitled to full protection under
the Constitution as implemented by Miranda. Nor should there be any
different holding because the offense is found in The Vehicle Code instead
of The Penal Code."80 Following a similar line of reasoning, the dissent in
State v. Neal"5 criticized the majority's holding that Miranda is inappli-
cable to all misdemeanors arising from the operation of a motor vehicle by
noting that "the consequences of conviction may in sum total be as serious
for the misdemeanant as for the felon."8 2 State v. Angelo8 provides an actual
76See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969). See
also People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d 670 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 911 (1966)
(dissenting opinion); Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. Rzv.
685, 708-15 (1968) (suggesting that in some misdemeanors the stigma flowing from official
condemnation alone should be deemed a serious consequence for sixth amendment purposes).
77See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1037 (Purdon 1971) ("a fine of not less than one
hundred dollars ($100.00) and not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) ... or undergo
imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, or suffer both such fine and imprisonment");
State v. Angelo, 251 La. 250, 203 So. 2d 710 (1967) (defendant received concurrent twelve-
month and sixteen-month sentences upon conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a
minor and indecent behavior with a juvenile, both misdemeanors).
78See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 564.440, 302.302, 302.304, 302.309 (Vernon 1972).
79Commonwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969).
sold. at 460, 258 A.2d at 680 (footnote omitted). See notes 27-30 supra & text
accompanying.
81476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972).
32d. at 556 (dissenting opinion). The dissent further states that "to exempt literally all
offenses involving the operation of a motor vehicle from the application of Miranda would
equate a speeding ticket with a prosecution for manslaughter by culpable negligence in the
operation of a motor vehicle under Sec. 599.070, an equation we regard as untenable ....... Id.
In Missouri the first two convictions for operating a motor vehicle under the influence are
considered misdemeanors. The first offense may result in up to six months in the county jail,
while the second may bring a one year term. In addition, a second conviction results in the
loss of the misdemeanant's driving privileges. The third and subsequent offenses are felonies
for which the penalty is either incarceration in the county jail for not less than ninety days nor
more than one year, or by confinement in the penitiary for a term of not less than two nor
more than five years. See Note, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Application of Miranda
v. Arizona to Motor Vehicle Violations, 38 Mo. L. REv. 652, 655-56 (1973).
83251 La. 250, 203 So. 2d 710 (1967).
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example of the serious consequences which may befall a misdemeanant.
Angelo, an adult, was convicted in a juvenile court of contributing to the
delinquency of a juvenile and indecent behavior with a juvenile. He was
sentenced to concurrent twelve-month and sixteen-month sentences. The
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed both convictions and sentences, hold-
ing that Miranda does not apply to an accused charged with a misde-
meanor.
8 4
The severity of the consequences clearly seems to be a more rational
factor in determining whether Miranda should be applicable in a particular
situation than a mechanical distinction between felonies and misde-
meanors. Simply because a state happens to label a certain offense a
misdemeanor does not mean that the penalty for that offense will not entail
heavy consequences. As Angelo indicates, misdemeanor convictions can
lead to a substantial deprivation of liberty.
The utilization of "severity of consequences" as a threshold for the
necessity of Miranda warnings may not prove wholly satisfactory either.
Such a test is too elastic and uncertain. What may be serious to one court
may not be serious to another court. Moreover, a court may find a penalty
to be severe in one case, while in another case the same court may find that
the penalty was not severe in light of the egregious nature of the offense.
Additionally, such a definitional test would lead to a case-by-case after the
fact analysis. It would be nearly impossible for law enforcement officers to
discern when Miranda warnings would be required.8 5 On the other hand,
it would seerm that deprivation of liberty is per se a severe penalty.
Accordingly, one way to forestall the uncertainty of a broad "severity of
consequences" test is to employ instead a standard based on the "poten-
tiality of incarceration."
POTENTIALITY OF INCARCERATION STANDARD
In view of the foregoing problems pertaining to the application of
Miranda in the nonfelony context, a solution is needed which will provide
a practical yet protective standard. The proper solution to the dilemma can
be derived from the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Argersinger v.
Hamlin86 in connection with the right to court-appointed counsel. In
Argersinger, the Court ruled that defendants accused of any imprisonable
offense are entitled to the right to have counsel appointed. It seems clear
that analogizing the "potentiality of incarceration" standard espoused in
Argersinger to the context of the right against self-incrimination leads to
141d. at 255, 203 So. 2d at 711-12.
8 5For example, consider the practical difficulty for a police officer arresting an
individual in Missouri for driving under the influence of intoxicants of knowing the severity
of consequences for that particular defendant under the law of that state, which can turn on
how many previous convictions the individual has. See authorities cited in note 96 infra.
86407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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the conclusion that, in the self-incrimination context, a similar standard
would alleviate the constitutional objections to any blanket rule exempting
nonfelonies from Miranda requirements. Moreover, such a standard would
meet the fears of many courts that effective law enforcement would be
impeded by requiring warnings in some but not all nonfelony cases.
In Argersinger, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to
counsel attached to any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor or
felony, for which one may be imprisoned.8 7 Mr. Justice Douglas wrote that
assistance of counsel might well be necessary, even in a petty offense
prosecution, in order to ensure a fair trial.88 He pointed out that the
questions involved in a case that actually lead to incarceration, even if only
for a brief time, are no less complex than those which may lead to a
sentence of more than six months.
8 9
The reasoning of Mr. Justice Douglas applies equally to the issue of
whether Miranda warnings are required in nonfelony cases which neverthe-
less threaten imprisonment. It seems that coercive police practices which
Miranda was intended to curb or eliminate are not limited to felony cases.90
Thus, it is inconsistent with the policies underlying Argersinger to require,
on the one hand, that the right to assistance of counsel be protected with
respect to a defendant charged with an imprisonable misdemeanor, while
on the other hand with respect to that same imprisonable misdemeanor, to
permit the police not to advise the accused of his Miranda rights, which
include the right to have the assistance of counsel. 91 In many instances, not
requiring Miranda warnings to be issued to misdemeanants who face
potential incarceration will in effect render the right to counsel under
Argersinger a nullity.
For example, the elements generally material to a conviction for the
misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated are intoxication and operation
of the vehicle by the defendant. If after arresting the defendant, the officer
asks him if he was driving, and the defendant answers affirmatively, then
operation of the vehicle is established. If the defendant is not warned prior
to the interrogation of his right to see an attorney, then his Argersinger
Wd. at 37. In Argersinger, Mr. Justice Douglas rejected "the premise that since
prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six months may be tried
without a jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer." Id. at 30-31.
11407 U.S. at 33.
891d.
90 ndeed, one may envision.certain misdemeanors, e.g., driving while intoxicated, where
coercive police practices would be more prevalent than in certain felonies, e.g., embezzlement,
where such practices would be less likely to occur. See notes 33-35 supra & text accompanying
for an illustration of a misdemeanant subjected to such practices absent Miranda warnings.
91The inconsistency of an accused's having the right to counsel at trial under
Argersinger, yet not being informed of this entitlement until after interrogation, is heightened
in light of the fact that Miranda was partially based on the sixth amendment right to counsel.
384 U.S. at 465-66.
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right to assistance of counsel will be an exercise in futility because the
material elements of the offense have already been established. Hence, the
constitutional right to counsel is effectively watered down when the case is
already made against the defendant before he is even advised of his right to
such assistance. 92  Therefore, in order to preserve the constitutional
mandate of that decision,93 it follows that Miranda warnings should be
afforded every defendant charged with a nonfelony which carries with it the
potentiality of incarceration.
This proposition must also meet the argument that the present
Supreme Court is apparently unwilling to expand the parameters of
Miranda.94 Therefore, it should be emphasized that the potentiality of
incarceration standard does not represent an extension of Miranda; rather,
under the mandate of the policy considerations which underlay both the
921t seems clear that the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), intended to
prevent such situations. The Court stated:
Without the protections flowing from adequate warnings and the rights of counsel,
"all the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an
accused or any other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where
the most compelling possible evidence of guilt a confession, would have already
been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police."
Id. at 466 (citations omitted).
93But see Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976), which seems to indicate that the
current Court is limiting the reach of Argersinger rather than extending it. In Middendorf,
the majority, in an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, refused to apply Argersinger's
constitutional mandate of appointed counsel to summary court-martial proceedings even
though the plaintfiffs faced possible confinement at hard labor for thirty days, reduction in
grade and loss of pay. Id. at 34-37. In support of its holding, the majority cites Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), for the proposition that "[t]he fact that the outcome of a
proceeding may result in loss of liberty does not by itself, even in civilian life, mean that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is applicable." Id. at 35. In Gagnon, the Court held
that a probation revocation proceeding was not a "criminal proceeding," and hence the right
to appointed counsel did not arise.
Conceivably, the Supreme Court's refusal in Middendorf and Gagnon to extend
Argersinger's imprisonable offense standard might be interpreted to indicate that the Court
would be unwilling to develop such a threshold test for the requirement of Miranda
warnings. However, a more plausible explanation of the Court's restrictions on Argersinger's
imprisonable offense test in Middendorf and Gagnon is the sui generis nature of these two
cases.
In Gagnon, the Court noted that there were critical differences between probation
revocation proceedings and criminal trials. 411 U.S. at 788. Moreover, in such a proceeding
the defendant has been previously sentenced. Likewise, in Middendorf, the summary court-
martial differs in many respects from a traditional trial. 425 U.S. 38. Also, decisions of the
Supreme Court indicate that cases involving the military community are often treated
differently. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). See also, Note, The Right to Counsel at
Summary Courts-Martial: COMA at the Crossroads, 52 IND. L.J. 241 (1976), for a critical
analysis of Middendorf.
Thus, if confronted with a case to which Argersinger's requirement of appointed counsel
clearly applies, such as a driving while intoxicated offense, the Supreme Court might be less
reluctant to utilize the "potentiality of incarceration" standard for the triggering of the
requirement of Miranda warnings.94See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246-47 (1973).
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Miranda and Argersinger holdings,95 the implementation of the potentiality
of incarceration test in the nonfelony situation strikes the proper balance
between protection of fundamental constitutional rights and the require-
ments of efficient and effective law enforcement.
CONCLUSION
It is imperative that the problem of the applicability of Miranda to
nonfelonies be resolved. The utilization of a "potentiality of incarcer-
ation" standard would require Miranda warnings only in those cases where
the defendant faces the possibility of imprisonment. This test balances the
competing constitutional requirements and policy considerations in the
best possible manner. Such a rule, while not jeopardizing the achievement
of efficient and effective law enforcement, meets the constitutional require-
ments of the fifth and sixth amendments.
Requiring Miranda warnings for any offense for which the loss of
liberty is a possible sanction would meet many of the arguments advanced
against such an application of Miranda. The argument that misde-
meanors, motor vehicle violations and petty offenses do not involve
consequences serious enough to warrant the application of Miranda would
be weakened significantly by the imprisonable offense limitation.96 Simi-
larly, objections based on practicality and routineness may be minimized
under such a test in light of the limitation. Moreover, the presence of
95See note 92 supra & text accompanying.
"
5This view may explain the decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), where
the Court held that the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by jury applied to all
misdemeanors except so-called "petty offenses." Id. at 161. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66 (1970), the right to jury trial was reaffirmed in cases where the offense is not petty, i.e.,
those carrying potential imprisonment for more than six months.
Before the Argersinger decision, at least three courts denied the application of Miranda
to nonfelony offenses on the strength of analogy to Duncan. See State v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St. 2d
64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970):
The Supreme Court of the United States has refused to apply some provisions of the
Bill of Rights in the federal courts, such as the right to a jury trial, in so-called petty
offenses, which it has defined "as those punishable by no more than six months in
prison and a $500 fine." It is difficult to perceive why the requirements of Miranda
should be imposed upon Ohio in this case, where the maximum penalty was a fine
of $500 and imprisonment in the county jail or workhouse for six months.
Id. at 68-69, 249 N.E.2d at 828-29 (concurring opinion) (citations omitted). Accord, County of
Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); State v. Desjardins, 110 N.H. 511,
272 A.2d 599 (1970).
But the Supreme Court has since indicated that the right to counsel is higher on the
scale of fundamental rights than the right to trial by jury: the potentiality of imprisonment for
any period triggers the right to counsel under Argersinger, while only the possibility of
imprisonment for six months or more invokes the right to jury trial under Duncan and
Baldwin. Since the Miranda warnings include advising a suspect of his right to have the
assistance of counsel, it follows that a misdemeanant facing possible imprisonment for any
period of time should be entitled to Miranda warnings. Thus, any analogy to Duncan is
comparatively weak when measured against the standard proposed herein. See notes 86-95
supra & text accompanying.
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Argersinger's mandate mitigates the impact on states' legal resources that
would be entailed by a rule broader than the potentiality of incarceration
standard.97 It is difficult to believe that a potentiality of incarceration
standard would significantly impair effective police investigation. Indeed,
it seems that effective prosecution demands the issuance of Miranda
warnings in the majority of situations.98 One foreseeable objection to
drawing the line at imprisonable offenses may be based on the seemingly
unfair burden placed on law enforcement authorities to discern impri;-
onable from nonimprisonable offenses. 99 Nevertheless it appears impera-
tive that the possibility of incarceration be entitled to the status of "serious
consequence."10 0 Although police officers cannot be expected to know as
much law as a judge, it does not appear unduly burdensome or unfair to
require officers to know which offenses involve possible incarceration.
MARK J. ROBERTS
97Because Argersinger forces a state to provide indigents with counsel at trial, requiring
Miranda warnings in only imprisonable offenses will in effect merely require a state to
provide indigents the opportunity for assistance of counsel at an earlier stage in the
proceeding. Providing counsel at an earlier point in the process will not result in an onerous
burden on legal resources. This protection is further strengthened by empirical studies
showing that Miranda warnings seldom lead to requests for counsel anyway. See notes 7-12
supra & text accompanying.
See generally Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IowA L.
REv. 1249, 1260-62 (1970), which estimates that there are four to five million court cases,
excluding traffic offenses, involving misdemeanors each year. The number of traffic
violations cases is estimated to be approximately fifty million.
See generally Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972). The Court states its
belief that the nation's legal resources are adequate to implement the rule that counsel be
provided to all indigent misdemeanants involving imprisonable offenses. The Court notes
that the additional number of attorneys estimated to be needed was "relatively insignificant
when compared with the total number of attorneys in the United States." Id. See also Junker,
The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REv. 685, 708-15 (1968).
98See State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547, 554-56 (Mo. 1972) (dissenting opinion). The dissent
points out the inherent risks involved in police failing to give Miranda warnings in situations
where it appears that only a minor motor vehicle offense is involved. Investigations may be
spoiled for want of Miranda warnings at the outset when police later find that a major felony
has been committed.99 1n Argersinger the burden is on the judge to determine before trial whether the offense
in question involves the possibility of confinement. 407 U.S. at 40.
10oSee Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), where the Court stated that "[tihe
prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a
trivial or 'petty' matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career
and his reputation." Id. at 73. See also Marston v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Va. 1971),
which held that "[a]ny incarceration of over thirty days, more or less, will usually result in
loss of employment, with a consequent substantial detriment to the defendant and his family."
Id. at 696.
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